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The death of UNDEREEILL MOORE reduces the small company of
those who have, in our time, forged new tools for legal thought. It
takes from the Law School a brilliant and well-loved teacher. And it
deprives the JOURNAL of a valued contributor and friend.
He will be missed. His work remains.
PRICE SYSTEMS AND COMPETITION:
THE BASING-POINT ISSUES
IN a decade remarkable for attacks on Supreme Court decisions, few have
been denounced so violently as the "basing-point" case, FTC v. Cement
Institute.' Perhaps none has been scored with less reason. Businessmen,
1. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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lawyers and Commissioner Lowell B. Mason of the FTC have cried that
the decision spells f.o.b. pricing throughout American industry.2 It does not.
But neither is it a panacea for our economy's monopolistic ills, as others
have hoped. This discussion will attempt to outline what the New Cement
decision and the earlier cases require of business pricing methods and what
they promise in the way of promoting effective competition.
But before taking up the cases it is necessary to describe what "delivered
price" policies are, what they are used for, and what kinds of economic
situations the courts and the enforcement agencies are attempting to change.
A GLOSSARY FOR GEOGRAPHIC PRICE SYSTEIS
In the United States, buyers and sellers of almost any product are all over
the map. Shipping costs vary among different sales transactions. The in-
dividual businessman may therefore vary his net returns on sales by vary-
ing the extent to which he makes different buyers pay the freight.3 A so-
called "industry-wide price system" develops when all or most producers
adopt the same pattern of charging shipping costs. The following are the
major types of industry-wide price systems.
F.o.b. price system. Each seller quotes a single price effective at his plant.
Each buyer pays the freight to his delivery point. The feature of quoting at
the plant is unique with f.o.b. pricing. In all other price systems, prices in-
clude freight and are effective at the point of delivery; hence the term "de-
livered price" systems. 4
2. See, e.g., Head, The Basing Point Cases, 26 HAnv. Bus. Rv. 641, 655 (194S);
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1948, p. 45, col. 3, p. 49, col. 7-8; N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Nov. 24,
1948, p. 30, col 4. For Mr. Mason's extreme interpretations see Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Sm.. r-s.
241, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 64, 66 (1948).
Not all business groups have been fooled: "... one of the most popular interpreta-
tions of the destructiveness of the basing point decision is that it prescribes that all Sales
must be priced on an f.o.b. plant basis. How it is possible to read that into the dictum of
the court the impartial student cannot readily discern. .. ." Oil, Paint and Drug Re-
porter, Sept. 6, 1948, p. 40, col. 1-2, cited in Zlinkoff and Barnard, Basing Points and
Quantity Discounts, 48 CO- L. REv. 935, 1004 (1948), which also gives a limited interpre-
tation of the decisions.
3. Varying the extent to which customers pay the freight is of course just one method
of setting a pattern of relative prices. A firm may set a high price in a "strong" market,
a low price in a "weak" market, with no particular reference to freight charges at all. See
sources cited in note 29 infra.
4. The term "delivered price system" is restricted to cases where other than actual
freight is charged some buyers-i.e., where the net mill price aries among different cus-
tomers. An fo.b. seller may quote a so-called delivered price, but it would in every case be
f.o.b. plus actual freight. Similarly a delivered-price seller may quote an "F.O.B:' price to
a buyer, but it will be a phony f.o.b. price if the buyer cannot accept delivery at the plant.
See Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38 Amx. Eco.er. Rrv. 815, 817-S (1943), and note 29
infra.
Delivered price systems, as defined, have been used in the marketing of hundreds of
items, including iron and steel products, electrical equipment, chemicals, tires and tubes,
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Freight equalization system. All sellers have the same mill price. Each
seller quotes the mill price plus actual freight costs to all buyers within his
normal market area. In selling to a distant buyer, however, the seller
quotes the standard mill price plus the freight that would be charged by
the competing seller nearest the buyer. Freight charges to any particular
buyer, then, are "equalized." And all sellers actually competing for a sale
tend to quote the same delivered price to any one buyer regardless of each
seller's location. On sales in areas nearer a competitor, a seller receives a
lower net price than on sales within his own area since actual freight is not
included in the delivered price. This deficiency is called "freight absorption."
Multiple basing-point system. The simplest form is much the same as
freight equalization. The only difference is that mill prices may vary from
seller to seller. Where all sellers' plants are "basing points," each seller
quotes a delivered price to a given buyer computed as the lowest total of a
base price plus delivery cost from that base. On nearby sales the seller's
own base price will be used; on distant sales, the base price used will usually
be that at the base nearest the buyer. More commonly, however, one or
more sellers do not adopt base prices at their plants, but quote all prices on
other basing points. Since a non-basing-point seller in making local sales
computes price as the total of a base price elsewhere plus freight from that
base, he is said to collect "phantom freight" on such sales. Whether or not
there are non-basing-point sellers, all producers tend to quote the same de-
livered price to any one buyer since all use the same price formula.
Single basing-point system. A single city is designated as the basing point.
All sellers quote the same delivered price to any one buyer by adding to the
single base price the would-be freight charges from the basing-point, regard-
less of the actual freight costs. Only a seller located at the basing-point re-
ceives equal net prices on all sales.
Zone price system. The country is divided into several more or less arbi-
trary zones. All buyers within a zone tend to be quoted the same delivered
price by all sellers regardless of the sellers' locations, but the price varies
among zones.
Uniform delivered price system. All buyers are quoted the same delivered
price by all sellers regardless of location.
THE EFFECT OF DELIVERED PRICES ON COMPETITION
Delivered price systems become important when they deprive buyers and
the economy in general of the benefits of competition.' The systems may do
paper products, and farm machinery. See George, The Law and the Economics of Basing
Points, Dun's Review, Sept 1948, p. 30; WILCOX, CoM MTIroN AND MONOPOLY IN AmEa-
CAN INDUSTRY 147-8 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940) (hereinafter cited as WiLcox).
5. In an ideally competitive market there would be (1) enough sellers and buyers so
that no one could manipulate price to his advantage; (2) perfect knowledge of all terms at
which a product is being bought or sold, so that a buyer could always make the best possi-
ble deal; and (3) perfect transferability of productive resources, so that when additional
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this. They need not. Price systems are just one aspect of competition.
The effect of delivered price depends on the market structure in which they
are used.7
Individual sellers use delivered price policies in a multitude of markets
that are competitive by any reasonable standard. There is no need to worry
about these. Only a purist would cry "monopoly" when a particular brand
of candy bars, shirts or shoes sells at uniform prices throughout the country
or "slightly higher west of the Rockies." 3 Delivered price policies are there
adopted to facilitate advertising and permit a nation-wide market for the
individual seller.9 Or they may be used simply because transportation costs
are too small to be worth the accounting bother of separate calculation.
Prices on many of these items respond quickly to changes in cost and con-
sumer demand. 10 Where they do not, effective competition takes the form
of variations in quality." New businesses can move into these indus-
tries fairly readily, and inefficient firms are regularly forced out by com-
supplies are needed they could be produced, and when the need falls the resources could
produce something else. See, e.g., BAiN, PRiciNG, DismmuTino: AND E!1mLO'Lo_! r 119-
20 (1948) (hereinafter cited as BAIN), or any recent elementary economics textbook. The
forces of such an ideal market would irresistably press price to the level of minimum
achievable costs, and would constantly adjust producing capacity to consumer demand.
Such an ideal market is unobtainable, but an industry lacking one or more of its fea-
tures may still yield something approaching competitive results.
6. All actual industrial markets are tapestries of "competitive" and "monopolistic"
threads. They are most fairly classified not by counting strands but by studying the
tapestry as a whole. Price policy is just one of the strands: "Determination of the status
of an individual trade.. . requires nothing less than a detailed analysis, product by
product, market by market, and year by year, of output and prices, of quality, service and
terms of sale, of costs and profits, of private agreements and public regulations and of the
effectiveness with which they are enforced." WILcox at 19-20.
The presence of one monopoly element may be counteracted-and the market made
more competitive-by the presence of another. See, e.g., Clark, Toward a Concept of
Workable CompMetiio, READINGs n- rn SocA% COMTOL OF IN DtsT" 454-5, 44-5
(1942).
7. For an excellent discussion of market structures, and a criticism of the popular
"competition v. monopoly" dichotomy, see Adelman, Effecift-c Competition ard the Anti-
trust Laws, 61 H-nv. L. REv. 1289, 1298-1304 (1948).
8. The monopoly element is in trade-marks, which differentiate the product of one
seller from that of another--e.g., one producer has a "monopoly" in Arrow shirts. But
ordinarily this does not give the individual producer substantial control over his price.
Close substitutes will relieve the producer of his market if he raises his price noticeably.
See BAm 241, 243; CHAn EmEiAx, Tan THEORY OF MOzOpOLSC Co:. rI'rTxo-; 58-63
(3rd ed. 1939).
9. This is not to say that all advertising is necessarily useful or even a matter of in-
difference. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protcelion of Trade
Symbols, 57 YAIx LJ. 1165 (1948). But advertising per se is not indicative of monopoly
in the sense of substantial market control, and among industries here being discussed there
is no such control.
10. E.g., cotton tex-tiles, WIirrcox at 32; knitted goods, id. at 38; men's clothing, id. at
40.
11. E.g., boots and shoes, id. at 46; women's clothing, id. at 43, BAnz at 249.
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petitive pressures. 12 The fact that individual sellers in these industries
quote delivered prices is of little or no significance to monopoly problems.
But delivered prices have also been a common feature of what may be
called "basically non-competitive markets." These are markets in which
sellers, come what may, will do everything possible to suppress competition.
They usually succeed in that aim. In such markets, delivered price systems
appear not in the form of flexible individual prices policies but as a rigid
price structure for an industry. These delivered price systems and these non-
competitive markets present the real problem and require more than cursory
analysis. The principal questions include (1) what market elements produce
rigid price structures; (2) how those elements produce rigid prices; (3) the
harmful economic results; (4) the possible effects of imposing f.o.b. pricing;
and (5) the effects of prohibiting common use of a complex pricing formula,1 8
Market elements producing rigid delivered prices 14
Few sellers. Where a product is produced or sold by a limited number of
firms, a price change by any one firm is likely to have a sizeable effect on
the sales and therefore the prices of the others, particularly those closest in
location. In other words, the price policies of the various sellers are inter-
dependent.15
12. Freedom of entry (and corresponding rapidity of exit) stems principally from the
relatively small scale of operations required. For examples, see WILCOX at 32, 34, 36, 38,
39, 42,46.
13. The following analysis of non-competitive market structures draws heavily from
BAIN at 176-221; MILEM, UNFAIR COMPETITION 172-93 (1941) (hereinafter cited as Mm-
LER); NEAL, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRICE FLXmLUTY 70-89 (1942); Clark,
Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAN. J. OF ECON. & POL. Sci. 477 (1938) ; lin-
perfect Competition Theory and Basing Point Problems, 33 Am. ECON. REv. 283 (1943).
14. It should be re-emphasized that lack of effective competition is not the necessary
concomitant of any particular market characteristic. Even the element of few sellers may
appear in a market clearly competitive-e.g., tires and tubes, WILCOX at 48-50. And see
note 6 supra.
15. Markets with few sellers-known technically as "oligopolies'"-are apparently the
dominant form of market in American industry. WILcox at 113-18. In 40% to 50% of
products covered by the 1937 Census of Manufactures, four firms controlled three-fourths
or more of the supply. Id. at 116.
The term "few sellers" is necessarily elastic and covers a wide variety of patterns.
BAIN at 178. Moreover, the appropriate market must be defined. The figures of the 1937
Census understate the concentration of production wherever the national "market" is in
fact a number of more or less separate sub-markets. Yet they tend to overstate concentra-
tion in some cases by separating products that are close substitutes for, and hence conpeti-
tive with, each other. For discussion and citations, see Adelman, supra note 7, at 1292-6.
A recurring factor in concentration is the "economy of large-scale production." Where
the most efficient scale of plant is such that a few firms of that size can supply the whole
market, oligopoly is a "natural" phenomenon. But the process of concentration can be
carried well beyond the point of optimum scale by horizontal integration, and concentration
may be maintained by financial, institutional and legal barriers to entry of new firms. BAIN
at 178-9. And see note 54 infra.
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High fixed costs. The presence of high fixed costs-usually caused by
heavy capital investment-tends to widen the range of potential price
instability. When demand falls, for example, price will also fall until enough
capacity is put out of operation to restore equilibrium. Generally, firms will
keep on producing as long as returns from their sales exceed the "marginal"
-- other than fixed-costs of production, since any contribution to fixed
costs is better than none. But where fixed costs are high, marginal cost will
be well below average unit cost for most of the range of output up to ca-
pacity. Accordingly, if price originally was high enough for all costs to be
covered, it may have to fall a great deal before any substantial elimination
of capacity takes place- meanwhile everyone incurs severe losses."
Scattered location of sellers and buyers. Businessmen are compelled to go
afield when faced with an insufficient market in nearby areas. Since a
general reduction of price would reduce profits on sales to close buyers,
taking lower net prices only on distant sales is a more appealing price policy.
Significant tra?sportation costs. If delivery costs are noticeable but not
prohibitive, any one firm can profitably extend its market some distance,
but only by accepting lower net returns in its competitors' territories.
Standardized product. If the product is standardized, and is sold to manu-
facturers who will further process it, buyers have little reason to prefer one
seller over another except on the basis of price. Advertising, for example,
has little or no effect on sales of sheet steel. Buyers of sheet steel, in their
official capacity, are interested in specifications not slogans. Accordingly,
a price slightly higher than those of his competitors will cost a producer
most of his sales; a slightly lower price -ill expand his business tremendously.
In contrast to the highly sensitive demand facing any one seller, the
total demand for a standardized product not sold to consumers is almost
certain to be fairly insensitive to price changes. A fall in price will lead to a
less than proportionate increase in total sales by the industry. Assume for
example that the price of steel is 10 per cent of the cost of a car. A 20 per
cent reduction in the steel price would reduce car prices only 2 per cent.
Neither the demand for cars nor the "derived" demand for steel would rise
noticeably and total receipts by steel producers would fall.
17
The presence of large buyers. Important customers occupy a peculiarly
16. See Neal, op. cit. supra note 13, at 74-5, 77; Adelman, supra note 7, at 132s, citing
CLAnK, THE Ecoioancs OF OVERHEAD CosTs 416-33 (1923).
The presence of high fixed costs will not necessarily increase potential price insta-
bility, although there is a probability that it vill do so. If an industry has "marginal" firms,
just covering out-of-pocket costs, at most levels of demand, then a slight fall in price vill
drive out sone capacity. But it is a fair guess that such marginal firms represent an un-
important percentage of capacity in most mass-production industries. For the importance
of fixed costs in relation to steel pricing, see DAUGHERTY, Dr CmLzERu AND STRwrON, II
THE Ecoxomics OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 1093 (1937).
17. THE BASING POrNT PRoam s 15 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941). See also PurDY,
LINDAHL AND CARTER, CORoxT CoNcETRA IOrn AND PmmIc PocY' 4S0-1 (1942). The
cost of cement does not exceed 16% of the final cost of the products in vhich it is used.
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strong bargaining position whenever general demand is low. Individual
sellers are eager to secure a sale that may mean the difference between
profit and loss. The large buyer can obtain a concession by playing, or
pretending to play, one seller against the other."8 If the buyer's mastery is
complete, he may drive the price down to the level of marginal costs.
How a rigid delivered price structure develops
When the above market elements are woven together, business price
policies tend to drift into a definite pattern. The immediate interests of an
individual seller whose plant is partially idle would appear to dictate a
price reduction on distant sales so long as the price remains above additional
costs. But this assumes too much.
Price-cutting by one of a few sellers will cut deeply into the others' sales.
But the other sellers cannot tolerate this "piracy." They too will play the
price-cutting game and relative market shares will wind up about the same.
And if total demand is only slightly responsive to a price drop, the small
increase in sales shared by each producer will not make up for the fall in
price. The efforts of the price-cutter to better himself will not only have
been in vain-they will have increased his losses. Moreover, if the price-cut-
ting spirals all the way down to marginal cost, the losses in unrecovered
fixed costs will be extremely severe among all sellers. Nor is this all. A
general price cut may "spoil the market" by making it difficult to increase
prices in the future. It may actually reduce sales if buyers interpret the
cuts as merely the first cracks in the price wall and wait for further dis-
integration.19 In short, price competition in this type of market becomes
financial disaster. All sellers are put under tremendous pressure to stabilize
open price quotations, even in the face of a sizeable fall in demand 0 The
struggle for sales takes on other forms.
Instead of making an open price-cut on distant sales, the producer may
expand his sales slightly by merely meeting, but not undercutting, the
The Cement Institute v. F.T.C., 152 F2d 161 (7th Cir. 1945), Appendix A to Brief of
Respondents-petitioners, Chart I-B.
The example given in the text disregards the possibility of substitution-e.g., a fall in
the price of steel may lead to use of steel in place of plastics, aluminum, etc. But in addi-
tion to depending on relative prices of comparable products, the extent of the "substitu-
tion effect" is governed by technical requirements and the time required for change-over.
The long-run prospects of substitution ordinarily play a small part in short-run price
decisions, particularly where the producers think the prospects are dim. For the attitude
of steel producers, see THE BASING POINT PROBLEm, supra at 156-7.
18. Perhaps the best example is the tire industry, where automobile manufacturers and
mass distributors extract heavy concessions. WILcox at 49. Automakers and other large
buyers also appear to have secured persistent favors from steel companies. Trig BAsINo
POINT PBotLEm 46, 107 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941).
19. This reaction occurs frequently in such durable goods industries as steel. NAL,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 82.
20. "Under such circumstances, only the most sanguine or the most foolhardy seller
would start an open price-war. . . .And it is the importance of average overhead costs
[Vol. 58 -426
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prices of competitors in markets where they have a natural geographic
advantage. Simply because this policy is less effective, it is much less likely
to invoke a price retaliation by competitors. However, all sellers tend to
reason in the same way and all tend to snake into each other's markets by
meeting the going prices. 21 This is the genesis of a freight equalization or
basing-point system. Each seller becomes the "price leader" in his own area.
His competitors merely follow any price changes that he makes. But such
a system does not operate as a price-fixing device if it merely stabilizes
openly quoted prices, for there is another course available to a producer
dissatisfied with his slice of the market.
The dissatisfied seller, instead of making an open price-cut or merely
meeting the prices of other sellers, may secure additional sales by secret
price concessions to important buyers. This "price shading" takes several
forms.22 The seller may tack on quality or service extras or grant an un-
usually large discount for quantity purchases.2'3 He may also cut the ef-
fective delivered price by giving the buyer the benefit of truck or water
shipment, while other sellers are still charging rail freight. These practices
are price-cutting. In sufficient number, they mock open prices, restore open
price-cutting, and inflict greater and greater losses.2 4
Hence the harried members of an industry faced with the prospect of
ruinous price competition must do more than adopt similar open price
formulas. They must also refrain from secret cuts and must standardize
their practices with respect to other terms in the bargain.2 5 As a practical
matter, such complete identity of price practices cannot be achieved by
telepathy. At least a regular exchange of information is required to give
every seller sufficient assurance of what the other is doing. It may take some
gentle, or not so gentle, policing as well. In any event, the limited number
of sellers involved makes the job of containing price competition a com-
paratively easy one.
Summary. It is market structure that, first, puts tremendous pressure on
sellers to stifle competition, and then makes it possible for them to do so.
A complex delivered price formula is simply a convenient method of per-
which makes for disastrously low limits to, price declines once such price vrs begin."
NmAl, op. cit. supra note 13, at 77.
In cement, marginal cost is appro-dmately one-half average total cost at normal levels
of output. Hence if prices were driven to the level of marginal cost, the losses would be
tremendous. Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CA. J. o EcoN'. & PoL.
Sci. 477, 478 (1938). See note 16 infra.
21. Clark, Imperfect Competition Theory and Basing Point Problems, 33 Am. Eco-.
REv. 283, 290 (1943).
22. See, e.g., PascE RE.sEARcH = THE STEE= AND PTRrOLEUM IDuSm S 25-8, 32
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1939).
23. Ibid.
24. See Clark, supra note 20, at 479; Adelman, supra note 7, at 1331-2, n. 167; Puwy,
LnDAHL AND CARTER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 485, 488.
25. M L. at 186-7.
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fecting the restraints. Were the formnla denied sellers in this position, the
need to avoid price competition would still remain. And the sellers would
doubtless find another answer. An informal market-sharing agreement, a
merger, or a nicely balanced f.o.b. price system would solve the problem.
An individual seller's delivered price policy becomes significant as an
anti-competitive device only when every other seller is using the same
formula, and when all sellers are confident that gladly or reluctantly every-
one will stick to it. When delivered price policy is so stripped of its indi-
viduality, sellers forego completely the privilege of initiating price changes
outside their own territories-and they make few changes even at home.
The ultimate function of the whole mechanism is to establish price levels
that are stable and high enough for each producer to make profits even
though operating at less than full capacity.25 It is these rigid delivered
price systems that work economic harm.
The harmful effects of riid delivered price systems
Price systems are harmful to the economy (1) if they force unnecessary
shipping costs; (2) if they produce a higher level of prices than would result
from reasonably free response to changes in economic conditions; (3) if they
make some groups of buyers pay higher prices than others without regard
to cost, location or competitive pressures; (4) if they cause buyers and pro-
ducers to alter their location merely because of quirks in the price structure;
and (5) if they waste economic resources by creating excess capacity.
Although regularly indicted on all these counts, rigid delivered price systems
are unmistakably guilty of just the first two. The other complaints are
justified only in certain circumstances.
Unnecessary transportation costs. Under a rigid delivered price system, all
sellers quote the same price to any one buyer. Accordingly the buyer has
no strong reason for trading with the nearby, rather than the distant, pro-
ducer. This gives rise to a considerable amount of "cross-hauling"- e.g.,
a St. Paul buyer purchases from a Chicago firm at the same time that a
Chicago buyer purchases in St. Paul.
Not all purchases from other than the nearest seller represent unnecessary
transportation costs. Frequently, for example, the buyer desires quicker
26. "The statements of the [steel] executives who appeared before the TNEC are
replete with references to the iniquity of cutting below announced prices, the desirability of
'meeting' but no more than 'meeting' competition, the need for 'stabilized' prices, the impos-
sible situation which would be created by daily fluctuations in price, the importance of
looking at price reductions 'from the point of view of the industry as a whole,' the desir-
ability of discussing price changes with customers before they are announced, the need for
an agreement under which no company would quote any price below its own cost plus a
fair profit, the unfairness of a price which includes no profit, and the desirability of prices
which would permit profitable operation at 35 per cent of capacity." WILCOX at 151.
Cement producers have been fairly successful in maintaining profits over periods of
low demand, Adelman, supra note 7, at 1346; but steel producers on the whole have not,
WILcox at 153.
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delivery than the distant seller may be able to make.' But there is little
doubt that the waste of cross-hauling is substantial.2 '
High price levels. Rigid delivered price systems cause higher price levels
than would result from independent pricing by each seller. That is what
they are for. But it is extremely important to repeat that the underlying
market structure creates the desire and opportunity for rigid high prices.
A delivered price formula is just one way of getting there.
Injury to buyers. Whenever a seller collects different net prices from dif-
ferent buyers for the same commodity, he indulges in economic "price
discrimination." 29 All delivered price policies involve geographical price
discrimination by individual sellers. Even under a uniform delivered price
system, the net prices paid by buyers for the product vary invervely with the
freight service they receive."' Only under f.o.b. pricing do all buyers pay the
same net price to any one seller.
Unfortunately, the term "discrimination" implies that all price differences
are necessarily injurious to the buyer paying the higher net price. They are
not. Assume a simple case of freight equalization, with Buyer A and Mill A
in Chicago, Buyer B and Mill B in Pittsburgh, mill prices of $10 and freight
between Chicago and Pittsburgh of 82. In January, Mill A sells to both
buyers, collecting net prices of $10 from Buyer A and only 88 from Buyer B.
In February, Mill B sells to both buyers and now Buyer B pays the higher net
price. Each buyer appears to both "benefit" and "suffer" from the system.
Actually, however, the discrimination means only that both buyers have an
advantage of location near a mill which the would-be distant seller must
recognize. 3' The discrimination has no effect on the relative position among
27. Moreover, if (1) technical conditions require the joint production of several
varieties of a product, and (2) buyers in particular localities use only one or two of the
varieties, some so-called "cross-hauling" is inevitable. MuA.nn at 183. But strictly speal:-
ing this is not cross-hauling, since the products are not the same.
28. 1Mn at 182; Clark, mspra note 20, at 482-3.
29. For the prerequisites and economic effects of various types of price discrimination,
see Mum at c. IX, particularly at 122-30; Adelman, supra note 7, at 1328-37; Romniso.r,
Ecoxomcs oF IimERFc ComprFiou, cc. 15, 16 (1933).
One essential condition for successful price discrimination is the ability to separate
markets and keep them separated. Unless the producer can prevent re-sale, customers buy-
ing at the low price wvill over-buy and sell the surplus to other customers-thus in effect
makdng the producer compete against himself until the price differences disappear. Geo-
graphical dispersion of customers provides the producer .ith natural barriers against re-
sale, and enables him to maintain a delivered price system. The prices must be quoted at
point of delivery-varying net prices at the mill could not be maintained. See note 4 supra.
30. ". .. [P]rice uniformity in the presence of cost differences is no less a discrimina-
tion than price differences in the face of cost uniformity." 1u.Uhm at 145 n. 7.
31. ". . . [I]f a buyer in a given locality already has a low price available to him
from one seller merely because of his location.., the offer of an equally low price by a
second seller merely adds another potential source of supply and is not likely, in itself, to
injure competition with the buyer by the second seller's other customers." Corwin Ed-
wards, Director, Bureau of Industrial Economics, FTC, Remarks before the Machinery
and Allied Products Institute, Dec. 10, 1948 (FTC Mimeo. Release, p. 6).
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buyers, which depends not on the seller's net prices but on the delivered
prices to the buyers, regardless of how they are computed.
It is possible that the relationship between delivered prices charged
Buyers A and B in the above example would change if f.o.b. pricing were
adopted by each mill. Under f.o.b. pricing, Mill A would always sell to
Buyer A and the saving in freight would enable him to lower the price. But
he might just pocket the savings as profit. The same could be said of Mill
B and Buyer B. Only a detailed examination of actual market structures,
and a prediction of how relative prices would change under non-discrimina-
tory pricing could determine which if any buyer is being placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage.
This difficulty of establishing injury to particular buyers applies to freight
equalization, multiple basing-point pricing where all plants are basing
points, and to any uniform or zone-price system where transportation costs
are a small part of the price.
However, the possibility of harm to individual buyers is less a matter of
guesswork where the delivered price structure bears no relation to the
location of producers. Assume in the above example that Mill A was not a
basing point but, instead, calculated its prices as Pittsburgh mill price plus
freight. Then Buyer A would always pay 82 more than Buyer B and solely
because of the peculiar price formula used. Wherever there is non-basing-
point or highly artificial zone-pricing, buyers near the non-base or off-zone
mill suffer an unreasonable disadvantage-i.e., they do not get the advan-
tage of their location.
The principal injury caused by rigid delivered price systems of any type
is injury to buyers as a group, which results from the high average price
levels that are maintained. But this could be said of any price-fixing scheme
in a non-competitive industry. The geographic price discrimination in-
herent in delivered price systems is an incidental, not an essential feature of
high prices. 2
Paradoxically, rigid delivered price systems can maintain high price levels
only by eliminating a form of price discrimination which, although possibly
operating to the relative disadvantage of specific buyers from time to time,
ends up in progressively lower prices to all buyers. If one or more sellers
wink at the quoted price and make concessions to some customers, other
sellers may be forced to meet the offer or drop out of the market. The
quoted price then gradually becomes a fiction. A series of such disconnected
discriminations will shatter the high price level.33
In summary: (1) all delivered price systems involve systematic price
discrimination by sellers; (2) not all rigid delivered price systems favor some
32. [... T]he particular system of discrimination which results is not such as would
result from a careful and purposive estimate of the relative elasticities of demand of buyers
located at different points. Although the discrimination is incidental to the system, it is
not the explanation of the particular system." MLu.ER at 181.
33. See sources cited, notes 22-4 supra.
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buyers over others; (3) the principal injury caused by all the systems is high
prices to buyers in general; (4) this injury is substantially due to the fact
that the systems-through assurance of open price quotations-freeze out
sporadic semi-concealed price-cutting, which, although "discriminatory,"
produces lower prices in general.
Locationi. The pattern of relative prices to different buyers as such has
little or no effect on the location of producers.34 The most economic location
for producers is that which minimizes total costs, for it will yield the largest
net profits regardless of the price system. The minimum cost point depends
not only on the location of consuming markets, but on the location of raw
materials and labor supply and on comparative transportation costs of raw
materials and finished product.3 5 In practice, however, rigid delivered price
systems may affect location of producers in two ways. First, they tend to
stay the departure of firms whose location has been rendered obsolete by
changing circumstances, simply because, like any monopolistic arrangement,
34. "To elucidate this point, consider a highly simplified hypothetical case. Pittsburgh
and Detroit are two sites for steel expansion designed to serve a given market in Detroit.
Detroit is the lowest cost center (freight on finished product being included in cost). Un-
der an f.o.b. mill pricing arrangement, Detroit should be the site selected for epansion,
cetcris paribus. Unless price concessions were granted, Pittsburgh could not compete in
the Detroit market. Under a single basing system, where Pittsburgh is the base, Pitts-
burgh could sell in the Detroit market. Nonetheless the expanding steel company which
has the choice of a Detroit or Pittsburgh location in serving the Detroit market, will select
Detroit.. . .In that way, given the price at Detroit, it will maximize the spread between
total revenue and total cost. If a multiple basing point system were in effect, with Detroit
also a base point, Detroit would again be the more profitable location, even if Pittsburgh
had a favorable differential in base price." Isard and Capron, Obserations or the F11ture
Locational Pattern of Iron and Steel Production in the United States (to be published in a
forth-coming issue of the J. PoL EcoN.).
The argument that relative price structures as such have sizeable effect on location of
producers is a persistent one. The FTC in the not too distant past argued that basing point
pricing both (1) prevented decentralization of production and (2) stimulated the construc-
tion of plants at the plants at the outlying edges of a basing point area (i.e., stimulated de-
centralization). THE BASING POINT PROO Urt 58, 133 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941). Both
arguments are still being used. For the first, see Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38
Am. EcoN. REv. 815, 826 (1948) ; Walter Wooden, Associate General Counsel, FTC, Re-
marks before the National Industrial Conference Board, November 23, 1943 (FTC Mimeo.
Release, p. 3). For the second, see Corvin Edwards, Basing Point Decisions and Bsiness
Practices, 38 As. EcoN. REv. 8, 841 (1948). Dr. Edwards also uses a variant of the
first argument-the seller at a non-base-point is claimed to have been handicapped in ex-
panding since ". . . in selling toward the base ... as his transportation cost is increased,
the delivered price and his mill net ... fell lower and lower." Id. at 842. But if this is a
"handicap," how can it be removed? Assume a "Pittsburgh plus" system, with prices of
$10 a unit at Pittsburgh and $15 in Chicago (i.e., freight of $5). If Chicago is now estab-
lished as a base point, Chicago firms are in no better position to sell toward Pittsburgh for
they still cannot get a higher price than "Pittsburgh plus."
35. A further factor in location-in some cases-is the re-use of scrap derived from
fabrication losses. See, generally, George, The Law and the Economics of Basing Points,
Dun's Review, Sept. 1948, pp. 11, 50-6; Isard and Capron, Some Locational Factors in
the Iron and Steel Industry Since the Early 19th Century, 56 J. PoL Ecox. 203-17 (1943).
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they afford the protection of a high price level. " Second, certain of these
systems tend to have a reflex action on location of producers by shifting the
location of buyers.
An artificial delivered price system may well alter the location of indus-
trial buyers if the price of the product is a significant factor in their own
costs. Uneconomic location is most likely where a large amount of produc-
tion is carried on at non-basing-points. 7 If material costs are as of a certain
point plus, buyers tend to move toward that point. An example is "Pitts-
burgh Plus," a single basing-point system once used in the iron and steel
industry. Steel fabricators were pulled toward Pitt~burgh and away from
such natural producing areas as Chicago-Gary."' However, this dislocation
will not occur where every plant is a basing point-as in freight equalization
or simple multiple basing-point systems.
Excess capacity. "Excess capacity" means very little without reference to
business cycle patterns and the long-run trend of demand for a particular
commodity.3 9 Moreover, capacity is in no wise affected by the pattern of
comparative prices to different buyers. It is the general level of price and
its flexibility which influence capacity.
If national income and demand were stable, price levels which averaged
above those of competition would doubtless serve to promote excess capac-
ity. They would hold a protective umbrella over inefficient producers and
attract newcomers to the field. 4 Where demand fluctuates violently, how-
ever, rigid price systems not only keep prices from falling as rapidly as they
would under untrammeled competition, but also inhibit price rises. 41 Thus
the burning ardor of outsiders to enter the industry on the upswing is cooled.
In general, therefore, the net effects for good or ill on average long-run
capacity are uncertain.42
36. "If the proposition which some have advanced is accepted, namely, that production,
past and present, has tended to be unduly concentrated at Pittsburgh, this should not be
attributed causally to the existence of the basing point system .... [That system] may
only have veiled a partially obsolete locational structure which an f.o.b, mill system would
have brought to light." Isard and Capron, supra note 34.
There is also the possibility that delivered price systems may enable established pro-
ducers more easily to prevent development of new capacity by running the newcomers out
of business. See Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 815, 826 (1948).
But Fetter's further conclusion, ibid., that delivered price prevents geographical decentrali-
zation does not necessarily follow. See note 34 supra.
37. MILIR at 181.
38. Edwards, s-upra note 34, at 833.
39. In any industry-competitive or non-competitive-involving heavy investment in
durable equipment, excess capacity will be a recurrent phenomenon of depression, and a
persistent phenomenon of declining long-run demand and technological changes in produc-
tion technique. The problem is considered in TnE BASING POI14T PoaR.aB i 61-3, 130-2
(TNEC Monograph 42, 1941), but in a fashion corrupted by advocacy.
40. Id. at 61.
41. Adelman, supra note 7, at 1346-7.
42. There issome reason to suspect a tendency toward excess capacity. During pre-
war years, neither the cement nor steel industries ever operated at full capacity during any
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Summary. Highly artificial delivered price systems are likely to injure
some buyers and distort the location of industrial consumers. These facts
and the wastes of cross-hauling aside, the principal ill effects of rigid de-
livered price systems stem from their use to produce higher price levels than
competitive pricing would insure. Such artificially high prices injure buyers
in general, and under some conditions may promote excess capacity and
protect poorly located producers from seasonable extinction. But the blame
for high prices must go not to the delivered price formulas but to the under-
lying market structure which makes them possible.
Hence, the effects of rigid delivered price systems must be compared with
the probable results under price policies of any other type which could be
anticipated in such markets. The only alternative different in Mnd is f.o.b.
pricing. Although not to date accepted by Congress or the courts, the sug-
gestion that f.o.b. pricing be required of all sellers is a popular one. 4 Its
appeal is probably deceptive.
The effects off.o.b. pricing
Imposing f.o.b. pricing on a basically non-competitive market would im-
prove matters very little if at all. The effects on competitive relationships
among buyers are not subject to easy generalization-as has been previously
indicated. Cross-hauling might be materially reduced. But there is no
a priori reason to suspect that a one-price system will produce lower prices
than a system of discriminatory pricing. The effects of f.o.b. on price levels,
capacity and location are highly uncertain and may even be downright un-
desirable.
Cross-hauling. F.o.b. pricing would tend to eliminate cross-hauling if
freight costs were more or less proportional to distance. Each seller would
have a "protected" market surrounding his plant. The boundaries of this
area would be determined by the relation of his own to his competitors'
prices, and he could extend them only by reducing his price to all buyers.
But shipping costs are not uniform,44 and a likely result of f.o.b. pricing
would be more haphazard discrimination in freight rates. Whatever cross-
hauling means to the economy in terms of waste, it means business to the
railroads and other transport facilities. Producers precluded from absorbing
freight would still want to reach distant markets and shippers would still
one year-even in 1929. Adelman, supra note 7, at 1345; Tn. BAsnIG Pon,"r Pnorn.
130-1 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941).
43. For a brief survey of attempts to secure legislative enforcement of f.o.b., see Head,
supra note 2, at 644-5. The proposal has the support of many economists. See, e.g., Mund,
Monwpolistic Competition Theory and Public Price Policy, 32 Am. Eco'. Riv. 727 (1942) ;
Fetter, supra note 36. At one time even this publication joined the cause, Comment, Bas-
ing Point Pricing and Antitrust Policy, 55 YALE L.J. 558, 569 (1946).
44. "... a wilderness of freight rates and freight differentials, which once caused the
late Arthur Twining Hadley to remark that not even God knows how much it costs to
transport anything anywhere." Basing Points: The Grcat Muddle, 38 Fortune No. 3, p. 73
(1948).
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want the freight business. Downward pressure on key freight rates would
tend to sustain cross-hauling. 4 The only difference in such case would be
that shippers instead of producers would absorb freight.
Price levels. In a basically non-competitive industry, f.o.b. pricing might
increase the peptic ulcer rate among producers but it is unlikely that it
would promote independent pricing. Busiriess men still would be well aware
of the consequences of price competition, and would still seek the comforts
of stable high prices. 46 F.o.b. would make containment of price-cutting
more of a problem. But once achieved, the price floor would perhaps exceed
that of delivered price systems in its rigidity.
F.o.b. pricing makes it more difficult to establish and maintain satisfac-
tory market shares for all sellers by reducing the leeway that market inter-
penetration affords. Constant geographical shifting of demand would dis-
rupt the shares of individual sellers. But the problem is not uncontrollable. 47
Leeway may be restored by pressing down freight rates in sensitive areas.
Circulation of sales statistics can point the way to salvation. If Mill A has a
dearth and Mill B a sheaf of orders, redistribution can be accomplished by
Mill B raising its price as well as by Mill A making a price-cut. Later on,
Mill A can return the favor. And if by chance f.o.b. should make allocation
too exasperating a problem, it may drive firms into merger. s
The ultimate effect of f.o.b. pricing may be a higher average price level
than under delivered price systems. There is certainly reason to believe that
f.o.b. would increase upward flexibility of price. Wherever geographical
shifting of demand results in temporary local shortages of capacity, prices
must rise in order to bring distant sellers into the market. No seller would
lower the price on his entire output just to pick up a few additional sales.
Under delivered price systems, the distant seller does not have to do it and
local surpluses of demand tend to be filled at the going price 49
But there is a more serious disability of f.o.b. pricing. It would immobilize
the potent competitive weapon of hidden price-cutting as no operating de-
45. Clark, mupra note 20, at 487.
46. ". . . [To] enforce a system of uniform mill net prices, which would bring about
the price structure characteristics of pure competition, would not necessarily induce the
price level of pure competition. Where sellers are few and separated geographically, each
would soon learn to consider the effect of its price cuts on a competitor. While any firm by
cutting its uniform mill price to all might extend its market geographically, if rivals did
likewise, the initiator of the change would gain only the additional volume due to a lower-
ing of prices in its old market territory. The fact that the competitor met the cut would
prevent the first seller from extending its market geographically." MiLER at 190,
47. Clark is of the opinion that division of the field would result only "after the wars
had run their course and producers had learned that reductions of price were certain to be
met." Supra note 20, at 485. It is suggested that producers are well enough aware of this
fact without subjecting it to empirical testing.
48. For a discussion of the serious monopoly problems presented by mergers, see Com-
ment, Corporate Consolidation and the Concentration of Economic Power, 57 YALt LJ.
613 (1948).
49. See Nelson, Basing Point Problems: Comment, 33 Am. Ecox. Ray. 620-2 (1943).
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livered price system has ever been able to do.-" The mere occurrence of a sale
in another's territory would indicate a price concession and invite prompt
and costly retaliation. By so discouraging price-cutting, f.o.b. would intro-
duce a new element of rigidity in prices.51
Excess capacity. The long-run effects of f.o.b. on capacity are no more
certain than those of delivered price systems. A rigid price floor at the same
or higher levels would be no improvement. And greater upward price flexi-
bility would entice new capacity well beyond that resulting from more
stable prices.
Location. F.o.b. pricing might alter the location of some industrial buyers
if it replaced a system involving non-basing-points or highly arbitrary zones.
But so would any delivered price system that eliminated such features.
Moreover, these effects and the impact on location of producers-if any-
would tend to be swamped by technological developments, utilization of
new sources of raw materials and shifts in consuming markets because of
other dynamic changes. 52
In most respects, therefore, enforced f.o.b. pricing is far from a satisfac-
tory answer to the problems posed by rigid delivered price systems en-
50. Clark, suepra note 20, at 486.
51. Zlinkoff and Barnard, among others, go even further: "If a mill must sell f.o.b.
and must not receive varying prices for the commodities it produces, then there will be an
area around each mill that will be reserved to the mill free of competition. ... Local
monopolies might indeed be promoted in such a case." Sufra note 2, at 1012-3. The theory
is incorrect in all but a few instances. "F.O.B. mills cannot raise their base prices in com-
parison with adjacent mills without restricting the area in which they can sell, and thus
reducing their sales, so that their potential monopoly power is strictly limited... ." Fetter,
supra note 33 at 824-5. See also Comment, 55 YAxxz L.J. 55, 569 (1946).
But neither is it true that f.o.b. would promote vigorous competition, as is argued by
its proponents. Generally spealdng, no relative price policy is either "competitive" or
"monopolistic" per se. The result depends on the total market structure and the purpoze
for which a price system is used.
52. The shift of the steel industry to f.o.b. pricing in July 1948, plus the general
misapprehension over the effect of the New Cement case, occasioned a rash of investiga-
tions, comments, and announcements as to the impact on location. With the possible excep-
tion of some movement of consuming industries tow, ards sources of supply, the general
conclusions seem to be (1) that f.o.b., if enforced, would have negligible short or long-run
effects; (2) any effects will be lost in the shuffle occasioned by changes in the more im-
portant determinants of industrial location-increase in transportation costs, new =ethels
of production, new sources of raw materials, the usual e.xpansion of capacity induced by a
boom. Communication to the YALE LAW JouRx.NLL from Dr. K. A. Adelman, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 19, 1943, in the
Yale Law Library, summarizing data available as of that date, including surveys by the
staff members of Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland,
Chicago, St. Louis, and Dallas. Communication to the YA.n Law JOUMAL from M1r. AV. A.
Capron, Dep't of Economics, Harvard University, November 29, 1948, in the Yale Law
Library.
A Philadelphia economist, when asked for "straws in the wind on industrial migra-
tion," replied: "As far as I have been able to observe, there has been considerable vind but
almost no straws at all." Adelman, supra.
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meshed in basically non-competitive markets. Another alternative would be to
knock out some of the devices that enable agreement on prices.
The effects of prohibiting concerted action
As a practical matter, the maintenance of a rigid delivered price system
over any length of time requires some form of agreement among the pro-
ducers. Persistent standardization of the intricacies of freight charges, de-
livery methods, service extras and discounts is no easy task. Deliberately
or unknowingly, individual sellers will shade prices and prejudice the whole
price structure. If discipline or strong persuasion is necessary to keep errant
producers to a common price formula, the same discipline and a similar
formula would be necessary to make other forms of "price leadership"
effective.
Competitive pricing would accordingly be stimulated by prohibiting any
forms of agreement, including the mutual confessionals known as "statistical
information bureaus." Such sanctions would create the uncertainty that
makes room for sporadic semi-concealed price-cutting and generally lower
price levels. At the same time, they would leave the way open for individual
"freight absorption," to which no detectable stigma attaches, and which
has the positive advantage of providing a flexible means of adjusting supply
to demand without price increases or overbuilding of local capacity.63
But too much cannot be expected of these remedies either. They would
merely make each seller less certain of what the others would do. That
would be enough to promote independent pricing in an industry with such a
large number of sellers that agreement on a delivered price formula is neces-
sary to avoid competition. But where industries are strongly non-competi-
tive, the improvement in price results would be modest. Further gains would
require more drastic remedies-perhaps the fracture of horizontally-in-
tegrated firms,"4 perhaps outright regulation. Achieving competition or
53. "It would be neither practicaf nor economic in each individual area to have suffi-
cient plant capacity to meet maximum possible demand, with excess overhead representing
a heavy charge upon the price structure." Nelson, supra note 49, at 620.
54. Break-up of firms is itself no cure-all for the problems of monopoly. The principal
issue in every case would be whether enough firms could be created to destroy recognized
interdependence without at the same time creating an inefficiently small scale of operations.
This may be very hard-if not impossible-with many industries. Where transpor-
tation costs are high, for example, producers sell largely within limited areas. A com-
paratively large number of firms nationally would not preclude strong interdependence-
in the form of a series of overlaps-among firms in local markets. To illustrate, assume
that Firms Al, A2, As ... A100 are strung out from San Francisco to New York. Firm
Al could not change its price without severely cutting the sales of A2; A2 without affect-
ing A' and Aa; As without affecting A2 and A4 ; and so on.
Moreover, the most efficient scale of production is not always the size of plant beqt
designed to produce one commodity. At least the following problems are involved: (1)
utilization of by-products; (2) manufacture of joint products; (3) savings in technical
production cost through vertical integration; (4) lowering unit administrative and/or
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the goals of competition is an industry-by-industry proposition that has
no simple answer.
Summary
Classification of actual markets into "competitive" and "non-competi-
tive" types is a drastic over-simplification. But it perhaps suffices to in-
dicate the general nature of the relation of delivered price policy to effective
competition. In basically non-competitive markets, perfected delivered
price systems are primarily symptoms and not causes of economic ill health.
Their chief harm is in the high price levels established, an indictment com-
mon to any monopolistic price restraints. Competition may be strengthened
by the elimination of agreement, but strong pressures toward containment
of independent pricing will remain. In basically competitive markets on
the other hand, delivered price systems are primafacie innocent. Any sensi-
ble application of the anti-trust laws must take all of these market factors
into account.
THE ILLEGALITY IN DELIVERED PRICE SYSTEMS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act purports to forbid all deals in restraint of
trade. In the earlier cases, delivered price systems appeared only as in-
cidents of complex trade association activities, a field in which the Supreme
Court has wavered considerably in deciding whether or not there were illegal
restraints. Delivered price policy had no law unto itself. Price systems
stood or fell with the changing tide of judicial opinion on a more pervasive
issue-the extent to which industry could engage in practices that influenced
the general level of price.
In the American Linseed case of 1923, the Supreme Court struck down a
price-fixing agreement which included a carefully arranged and strenuously
enforced zone-price system.55 Two years later in the Mfaple Flooring and
Old Cement cases, basing-point systems escaped condemnation.-' s But the
circumstances were peculiarly favorable. Maple flooring producers used a
single basing-point plan, yet most plants were close to the basing-point and
the producers would quote f.o.b. if customers so desired.?T These circum-
stances and the convenience of quoting prices on a single base, said the
Court, justified the differences between actual and fictitious freight. 3
A more significant comment on price formulas was made in the Old Cement
case, relied on with misplaced trust by defendants in its more celebrated
selling costs; and (5) provision for research. See generally Tnon Aim Crov:zn, Tm-
Smaucruam oF IxmusTRY, Part VI (TNEC Monograph 27, 1941) ; Bun~s, Tim D:cu.nm
oF ComrnOrrx, c. IX (1936). And see note 15 stipra.
55. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 36 (1923).
56. 'Maple Flooring Mlfr.'s Ass'n v. United States, 26S U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfr.'s
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 263 U.S. 52 (1925).
57. 268 U.S. 563, 570-1 (1925).
58. Id. at 571.
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successor. Justice Stone remarked that multiple basing-point pricing ap-
peared to be a "natural" expedient adopted by sellers "in order to com-
pete." 51 This misapprehension of the purpose of a common price formula
may have been due in part to the Government's focus on informational ac-
tivities, which outwardly at least make an innocent appeal. For in both the
Old Cement and Maple Flooring cases the Court emphasized that there was
no specific charge of agreement to fix prices or to maintain the price sys-
tem," and that the evidence did not indicate price uniformity or rigidity. t
But the Court was not completely in the dark. A strong dictum in Maple
Flooring indicated that price formulas, freight-rate books and the like could
be used as the basis of price-fixing arrangements and that if so used they
were illegal.62 And in Old Cement the Court warned that price uniformity,
especially if accompanied by an "artificial" price level, would be evidence
from which agreement could be inferred. 3
The Maple Flooring dictum came alive in the Sugar Institute case of 1936.04
Sugar refiners used a basing-point price system as part of an extremely in-
tricate plan of open price quoting. 5 Security-minded refiners had been
continually harassed by competitors who wanted to compete, and who did
so by secretly shading the price. Hence the plan was devised to secure
"adherence, without deviation, to prices and terms . . . announced." 60
But this "cut off opportunities for variation in the course of competition" 0
-the plan was held an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The Sugar Institute case implied that the charity shown common price
formulas in Maple Flooring and Old Cement was no longer so readily availa-
ble. The Socony-Vacuum case of 1940-condemning in extremely broad
terms any measures whose purpose or effect is to alter market price-vir-
tually brushed the old cases aside.6
59. 268 U.S. 588, 598 (1925).
60. (a) ". . . [I]t should be pointed out that it is neither alleged nor proved that
there was any agreement among the members of the association, either affecting produc-
tion, fixing prices, or for price maintenance." 268 U.S. 563, 567 (1925).
(b) ". . . [T]he Government does not rely on any agreement or understanding for
price maintenance. It relies rather upon the necessary leveling effect upon prices of
knowledge disseminated among sellers as to some of the important factors which enter into
price." 268 U.S. 588, 605 (1925).
61. 268 U.S. 563, 567 (1925) ; 268 U.S. 588, 605 (1925).
62. 268 U.S. 563, 572, 585 (1925).
63. 268 U.S. 588, 606 (1925).
64. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
65. Id. at 578 passim, especially at 590.
66. Id. at 601.
67. Ibid.
68. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). "Any coibina-
tion which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though
the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the
extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering
with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and
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Enforcement by the F. T. C.
After the Sugar Institute case, the Federal Trade Commission replaced
the Department of Justice as chief enforcing agent of the antitrust laws in
the field of delivered price systems. It had already been established that
combinations in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could also be
"unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act." The
favorable drift of the Sherman Act cases gave the Commission something
to work with.
The FTC had long been concerned over delivered price. But after issuing
an uncontested cease-and-desist order against "Pittsburgh Plus" in 1924,73
the Commission had withdrawn from the field-apparently under the im-
pression that Maple Flooring and Old Cement prevented any effective action.
The Commission ended its inactivity with a group of four direct attacks on
delivered price systems. These cases reached the Seventh Circuit during the
period 1943-46.7' The complaint in each case was comilned use of a deliv-
ered price system to eliminate price competition among sellers-a Sherman
Act charge via Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act. The Commission was uniformly
successful. Further maintenance of a single basing-point, a freight equali-
zation and two zone-price systems by planned common course of action was
forbidden. In only one case did the parties deem it worthwhile to request
certiorari and that request was denied. 72
In each of these cases before the Seventh Circuit there was considerable
direct evidence of agreement on price formulas, cash discounts, freight rate
factors and/or other terms of sale.7 3 There was also the usual exchange of
statistics. But the court was quite willing to draw an inference of agreement
from the mere fact of unnaturally identical prices. "On the face of the sit-
uation," the M1ilk Clan Institute decision said, "it taxes our credulity to
believe, as argued, that petitioners employed this system without any
protects that vital part of our economy against any degree of interference. ... [Congress]
has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a
defense to price-fixing conspiracies." Id. at 221.
Regarding Maple Flooring and Old Cement, the Court said merely that they "were
decided ... on the express assumption that any agreement for price-fixing would have
been illegal per se." Id. at 217. But in comparison with the Socony-Jacunm doctrine,
the old Court's willingness to allow activities which had a "necessary leveling effect upon
prices" seems startingly out of date. See ff (b) note 60 ,tpra.
69. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1946). See discussion and citations, FTC
v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 690-3 (1948).
70. United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924).
71. Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943); U.S. Maltsters
Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC,
152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.
1946).
72. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
73. 134 F2d 354, 355-6 (7th Cir. 1943) ; 152 F2d 478, 4.0-2 (7th Cir. 1946) ; 152
F.2d 161, 163-4 (7th Cir. 1945) ; 156 F2d 899, 901-3 (7th Cir. 1946).
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agreement or plan among themselves." 14 The court was no more impressed
with the argument six months later in the Fort Howard case: ". . . [TIhe
artificiality and arbitrariness of the zone structure [here employed] is so
apparent it cannot withstand the inference of agreement." 75
Nor was the court misled with the claim that each seller used the price
formula in order to compete. It would go along with the idea that com-
petition required meeting a price decrease, but that all sellers must meet a
price increase did not make sense. 6
Meanwhile the FTC had begun an entirely new line of attack on delivered
price policies via Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936.7 The new approach won hands down in the Corn
Products and Staley cases,78 decided concurrently by the Supreme Court in
1946, but only in the course of a perplexing piece of statutory interpretation.
Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) forbid any price discrimination which way lessen or
injure competition among sellers or buyers, unless (1) the price differentials
make only due allowance for cost differentials or (2) the seller can show that
his lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor. In both the Corn Products and Staley cases, individual use of a
single basing-point system was found to have the "prescribed effect" on
competition among buyers. That each system produced this result was clear
enough. In fact, the Commission may have overproved its case.
Corn Products, a glucose manufacturer with plants at Chicago and Kansas
City, quoted all prices f.o.b. Chicago so that Kansas City candy-makers
receiving delivery from the Kansas City plant paid "phantom freight." 71
The price of glucose is of serious moment to candy-makers, who operate on
low profit margins in a bitterly competitive market. Evidence showed that
some Kansas City purchasers actually moved to Chicago to avoid the price
disadvantage.80 The Staley company, another glucose manufactuer located
in Decatur, Illinois, simply followed the Corn Products' f.o.b. Chicago
price policy so that candy makers in and around Decatur were suffering. 1
Neither company could justify the discrimination on the basis of meeting
lower prices of competitors.8 2 There weren't any lower prices to be met. So
the two aspects of injury and "good faith" were taken care of handily.
But the F.T.C. apparently need not have gone so far in proving injury
74. 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946).
75. 156 F.2d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 1946).
76. Id. at 906.
77. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946). The relevant portions are §§2(a)
and 2(b) only.
78. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v. Staley Mfg.
Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See Note, 34 CALir. L. REv. 257 (1946).
79. 324 U.S. 726, 733 (1945).
80. Id. at 739.
81. 324 U.S. 746, 748-9 (1945).
82. Corn Products did not raise the issue. The Staley company did but to no avail,
324 U.S. 746, 753-4 (1945).
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to buyers. For the statutory command, said Chief Justice Stone, requires
not "that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but
only that there is a reasonable possibilit, that they 'may' have such an
effect." 83
The Court's difficulties over the meaning of the statute occurred in de-
fining "price discrimination" and in applying the proviso on cost dif-
ferentials. The basic problem is whether "price" means seller's vel price or
buyer's delivered price. If the former, then all delivered price systems are
inherently discriminatory. The seller receives varying net prices and by
definition the variance is not attributable to cost. The question of illegality
under the Act would then reduce to the two questions of injury and "good
faith." But Congress in passing the Robinson-Patman Act specifically
rejected the suggestion that price be defined as seller's net price, and the
Court was aware of that fact.84
However, any delivered price system except uniform delivered price is
also "discriminatory" in that delivered prices also vary from buyer to buyer.
Apparently on this basis, Justice Stone found that basing-point pricing
constituted price discrimination. But he then proceeded to measure the
discrimination by the difference between actual and fictitious freight."5 So
seller's net price became the real standard after all. Naturally enough, this
left uniform delivered pricing in a state of complete confusion. A dictum
in the Staley case stated that uniform price was not price discrimination."
But the discussion of legislative intent appearing in Corn Products clearly
inferred that it could be.' Moreover, in the Staley case Justice Stone defined
83. 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). The phrase "reasonable possibility" is a slippery one
The Chief Justice apparently meant "probability": ..... [Tihe use of the word 'may'
was not to prohibit discriminations having 'the mere possibility' of those consequences, but
to reach those which would probably have the defined effect on competition." Id. at 738.
But in the M$orton Salt case, the Court held that "possibility" means "possibility,"
and resorted to legislative history to support the conclusion that § 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act was intended to be broader than § 3 of the Clayton Act, which Justice Stone
had analogized in Corn Products. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 n. 14 (1948).
84. 324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945).
85. For the Court's acceptance of the "phantom freight' and "freight absorption"
tests, see, 324 U.S. 726, 732-3 (1945) ; 324 U.S. 746, 751 (1945).
That the Court %as using delivered price variations to find discrimination seems
necessarily implied in the lengthy discussion of the legislative history of the Act. 324
U.S. 726, 737 (1945). And see 324 U.S. 746, 756-7 (1945). But the process is not clear.
Compare notes 86-7 infra.
86. "But it does not follow ... that sellers ... may not maintain a uniform de-
liveied price at all points of delivery, for in that event there is no discrimination in
price." 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
87. "We think this legislative history indicates only that Congress was unvilling
to require f.o.b. factory pricing, and thus to make all uniform delivered price systems and
all basing point systems illegal per so. On the contrary we think that it left the legality
of such systems to be determined accordingly as they might be within the reach of § 2(a),
as enacted, and its more restricted prohibitions of discriminations in delivered prices!'
324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945) (emphasis added).
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a non-discriminatory price system as one "giving to purchasers, who have
the natural advantage of proximity to . . . [a] plant, the price advantage
which they are entitled to expect over purchasers at a distance." 83 By
that very persuasive standard, uniform delivered price could be the most
discriminatory of all.
For all their punishing complexities, the Corn Products and Staley cases
were off on a side issue in concentrating on injury to buyers. The core of the
problem was exposed in June 1947 when the Commission issued a complaint
against Corn Products, Staley and several other manufacturers charging
conspiracy to restrain price competition among sellers. If valid-and a good
guess would be that it is-the charge reveals the previous cases as "merely
particular, instances of the discrimination inherent in an industry-wide
collusive plan." 89
The strength and significance of the New Cement case lies in the fact that
the decision, unlike Corn Products and Staley, concentrated not on the dis-
criminatory aspects of delivered price systems but on their use in promoting
organized price leadership. In New Cement, the multiple basing-point sys-
tem used by cement producers was held to violate both the F.T.C. Act and
the Clayton Act.8 0 But the violation of the latter stemmed from injury to
competition among sellers; 91 and the violation of the F.T.C. Act, as in the
earlier Seventh Circuit cases, was in effect a violation of the Sherman Act
as well. The crux of the findings on both counts was the now-familiar one of
combination and agreement shown not only by more or less persistent
identity in prices 12 but by direct collusion as well.8 3 There had been or-
ganized opposition to the erection of new plants and organized discouraging
of delivery by truck or barge. There had also been punitive action against
"price-cutters." The fact that some companies "probably unwillingly
abandoned competitive practices" did not save them from blame where
their delivered prices "were, with rare exceptions, identical with the de-
livered prices of all their competitors." 14
In view of the finding that the basing-point system of price quoting had
lessened price competition among sellers, the Clayton Act was inescapable.
88. 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
89. Edwards, Basing Point Decisions and Business Practices, 38 Am. Ecom. Rev, 828,
830 (1948).
90. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720, 725-6 (1948).
91. The "discriminations substanitally lessened competition between [sic] respond-
ents." Id. at 726.
92. Id. at 713. Moreover: "Thousands of secret sealed bids have been received by
public agencies which corresponded in prices of cement down to a fractional part of a
penny." Ibid.
93. Id. at 710, 714.
94. Id. at 719. The Court also stated: "It is enough to warrant a finding of a 'cont-
lination' within the meaning of the Sherman Act, if there is evidence that persons, 'with
knowledge that concerted action was contemplated and invited, give adherence to and
then participate in a scheme." Id. at 716 n. 17, citing Interstate Circuit v. United States,
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For it was impossible for respondents to justify the price discriminations
inherent in the system as good faith efforts to meet competition. 5 But the
decision carries the Clayton Act no further. It does not enforce f.o.b. pricing
nor does it eliminate all but sporadic "freight absorption" by individual
sellers. In reply to an objection that the F.T.C. order had these effects the
Court was specific in its denial:
"The Commission disclaims that the order can possibly be so
understood. Nor do we so understand it. . . . iThe order by its
terms is directed solely at concerted, not individual activity on
the part of the respondents." 1
In the iNew Cement opinion, Justice Black reaffirmed that combination is
not essential to a violation of Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act, 7 and that in-
dividual behavior which may restrain competition is "unfair." 3 The
Seventh Circuit had occasion to use the first principle only si.teen days later
in the Rigid Steel Conduit case." Again producers were held to have violated
the F.T.C. Act by their use of a multiple basing-point system. But in this
case, the Commission extended Section 5 beyond Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Not only was combination charged, but on a second count producers
as indididuals were held to have violated the F.T.C. Act:
". .. through their concurrent use of a formula method of making
delivered price quotations with the knowledge that each did
likewise, with the result that price competition between and among
them was unreasonably restrained." 23
The court reached the same legal result it would have from drawing an
inference of agreement from parallel pricing.101 This is reasonable enough
as the economic result is the same whether the practices are called "con-
306 U.S. 208, 226-7 (1939) ; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 722-3 (1944) ; United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393-4 (1948). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
95. 333 U.S. 633, 725 (1948).
96. Id. at 727-8.
97. Id. at 721 n. 19.
98. Id. at 693, 708.
99. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948).
100. Id. at 176.
101. "In this situation . . . the legal question presented is identical with the one that
the Supreme Court considered in the Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute
case. . ." 163 F.2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1948). See note 94 supra.
It has been claimed that the FTC order in this case banned all freight absorption and
enforced f.o.b. pricing. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 6,3 (1948), Brief of General
Electric Co. as amicus curiae, p. 19; Head, supra note 2, at 651. But as in the Arew Cc-
ment order, the specific prohibitions of the Rigid Conduit order were limited by a gea-
eral modifier. The companies were ordered to quit practices carried on "for the purpose
or with the effect of systematically matching delivered price quotations vth other of
said respondents." 38 F.T.C. 534, 595 (1944) (emphasis added).
1949]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
current" or "collusive." The possibility of individual guilt is also useful for
enforcement purposes. Singling out one big firm is much easier than bring-
ing in an entire industry.
The Current Law of Delivered Price
The cases permit several definite conclusions on the current legal status
of delivered price policies. First, concerted maintenance of a price structure
which reduces price competition among sellers violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and consequently also violates Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act.
Rigid 'uniformity of prices by itself is evidence of agreement, since it re-
quires precise matching of all terms of the price bargain. Second, individital
use of a price policy is an "unfair method of competition" where all or most
producers are using the same policy and where the practice restrains com-
petition or "might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient
stages." 102
Third, delivered price policies which-lessen or may lessen price competi-
tion among sellers are inevitably a violation of the Clayton Act, since the
inherent variation in sellers' net prices cannot be justified as a good faith
effort to meet competition. 03 Fourth, non-basing-point or highly artificial
zone-pricing by an individual seller--which deprives some buyers of loca-
tional advantages-violates the Clayton Act since those buyers are placed
at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other buyers.
Fifth, so long as their activities do not flower into a rigid price structure or
promise to do so, individual sellers and their competitors may persistently
"absorb freight" on distant sales. The price discrimination that results is
not illegal price discrimination. There is no injury to competition among
sellers so long as a discrete collection of individual price systems does not
merge into an industry price system. And as indicated earlier in this dis-
cussion,0 4 it is highly unlikely that any particular buyers are injured by
simple freight absorption. Moreover, even if some buyers are injured, the
discrimination might be justified under the good faith proviso.
The "Basing-Point" cases and antitrust policy
New Cement and its companion cases got to where they are because the
antitrust laws are supposed to promote effective competition. Had the
decisions gone the other way, they would have crippled antitrust enforce-
ment in this field.
Yet the cases raise two further questions. Do the remedies supplied go far
enough to promote effective competition? And do the antitrust laws go
too far and permit the condemnation of innocent practices along with the
bad?
102. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
103. Uniform delivered price may be an exception. See notes 86-7 supra,
104. P. 435 mtpra.
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The answer to the first question is a conditional "no." The line of attack
represented by these cases is inadequate where the drive toward non-
competitive behavior lies in the market structure and surface agreement on
a common price formula is merely one technique. The burden of altering
market structures falls on the Department of Justice, which, under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, can split a few firms into many in order to restore
a measure of competition.'" 5 Where this is not practical, an industry is a fit
subject for regulation.
Regarding the prospective extent of the antitrust laws, attention neces-
sarily concentrates on the Federal Trade Commission. Section 5 of the
F.T.C. Act and Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, cut a wide swath. Both ban individual activities which "may"
harm competition. This is a thoroughly estimable purpose so long as a
particular proceeding makes sense in view of the over-all purpose of the
antitrust laws to promote competition. Whether sense is made or not de-
pends in large measure on the insight of the F.T.C., for a particular activity
may be "competitive" in one market and "monopolistic" in another.
Generally speaking, the present Commission has said enough about de-
livered price policies to indicate that it knows what competitive and non-
competitive uses are.
THE VIEWs OF THE F.T.C.
Critics of the "basing-point" cases, when not shouting "confusion and
uncertainty," have insisted that the F.T.C. plans to press business pricing
into the narrow mold of f.o.b.' These complaints receive unwarranted
support from Commissioner Mason.0 7 But the Commission's "official"
statement of policy toward delivered price-issued in October 1948-is
both specific and carefully confined.' 3
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination which may
injure competition among sellers or buyers. With respect to competition
among buyers, the Commission believes that showing of actual or sub-
105. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 21S (1947); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ;
Schine Theatres Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); Rostow, The New Shcmarm
Act, 14 U. oF CmL L. R=V. 567 (1947); Monopoly trdcr the Sherman Act: Powor or
Purpose?, 43 Iu.. L. REv. 745 (1949).
106. See, e.g., Head, supra note 2, at 650-1. The article is a hopeless misinterpreta-
tion of the cases and of what the FTC was after in trying them. An eample follows.
The FTC argued before the lower court in the Ne-w' Ceeinct case that direct collusion is
not necessary to achieve a price formula that suppresses competition. Mr. Head cites the
argument to support this conclusion: "The Commission has felt that this uniformity of
price in a market is bad regardless of whether it is the result of agreement or conpa-
tition." Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
107. See note 2 supra.
108. Mimeographed FTC release dated Oct. 12, 1948, entitled "Notice to the Staff:
In re: Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices" (Commissioner Mason
not participating).
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stantially probable injury from a delivered price policy must be made-
the easier standard of "reasonable possibility" of injury will apparently
not do." 3 In competition among sellers, the test of injury from geographical
price discrimination "is to be found in collusion or in tendencies toward
monopoly." 110
The problem under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act, states the Commission,
is "merely the old one of price-fixing." "I The legality of any price system
depends on whether or not it serves as a device for the elimination of price
competition, and the answer is "one of fact in particular cases." 112 Some
types can be more readily used to achieve "typically identical prices" than
others. F.o.b. pricing isnot ordinarily suspect because it does not lend itself
to an orderly industry-wide price systemn.113 With delivered price policies
this result is more likely, and the inference of collusion increases as the
industry price structure becomes "more rigid, more complex, and more in-
consistent with immediate competitive interests." 114
But freight equalization by a single or by several sellers raises no problem
the Commission thinks, under the F.T.C. Act so long as "a pattern of
pricing generally used" does not develop "with resultant matching of
delivered price quotations." "I And uniform or zone-pricing by one of
several sellers does not imply collusion where there are "simple and logical
explanations in the nature of the market, the product, and the transporta-
tion costs." 116 In every case of rigid price structure investigated, the
Commission notes, it found "direct proof of collusion" in establishing and
maintaining the system.117
And to conclude: "In approaching these questions, the Commission sees
no public interest and has no legal authority to proceed against the practices
of a single seller except where probable or actual injury to competition
appears in that seller's pricing practices." 11
Analysis of the FTC's Position
The Commission's views are well within the boundaries set by the cases.
But there is an omission of opinion on a potentially dangerous feature of
109. Id. at 8. In other words, the FTC in dealing with delivered price systems will
not make use of the full leeway granted by the Corn Products case, 324 U.S. 726, 738,
742 (1946) ; and by FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 (1948).
110. FTC, supra note 108 at 7.
111. Id. at 1.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Ibid.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Ibid.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
For the individual views of six staff members of the FTC on various economic and
legal aspects of geographic price systems, see 37 Gao. L.J. 135-231 (1949).
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the Robinson-Patman Act, and the definition of standards under the F.T.C.
Act is not so clear as it needs to be.
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. It would be hard to quarrel with the
Commission's insistence on a substantial showing of competitive injury to
buyers in proceedings against an individual seller's price policy. As empha-
sized earlier in this discussion, such injury cannot be deduced merely from
variation in a seller's net prices.11 9 Injury to particular buyers appears only
in circumstances like those of the Corn Products and Staley cases.
The injury to buyers usually found in this field is that all are injured by a
delivered price system that produces high price levels by decreasing com-
petition among sellers. Yet here there is little reason to use the Clayton
Act at all. It is not price discrimination that is important but the pattern
of collusive or "parallel" behavior. The Sherman Act applies. Section S
of the F.T.C. Act applies. The Clayton Act is superfluous and misdirected
in emphasis.
There is an even stronger reason for avoiding the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act. As the statute now stands, it threatens
sporadic semi-concealed price-cutting. This activity is price discrimination,
for some buyers benefit from the secret price and others do not. But it is
such a powerful competitive force that industries adopt rigid delivered price
systems to stop it. The Sugar Institute case was a perfect example.1' 2 Use
of the Robinson-Patman Act against sporadic hidden price-cutting would
tend to calcify the prices that the antitrust laws in general are supposed
to make flexible.
It is on this issue that the F.T.C. has failed to contribute much enlighten-
ment. The Commission has clearly indicated that it does not consider
injury to sellers to be involved: "Except where . . . a tendency tovard
monopoly appears, the Commission does not regard an effort to get business
from a competitor by sporadic price reductions as illegally injurious to
that competitor." 121 But this gives no clue as to whether such activity is
illegally injurious to other buyers.
For several reasons, however, the possibility of extensive use of Section 2
in this field is slight. First, the discrimination must affect competitive
relationships among buyers. In an industry like steel, many buyers are
simply not in competition with each other-for example, automobile
manufacturers and the producers of toy tractors. Second, it may be hard to
classify a hidden price-cut as discrimination where (a) the producer grants
119. P. 435 .pra. Zlinkoff and Barnard question the Commission's position: "There
does not appear to be any reason why the Commission should adopt one test of injury
to competition in a basing point case and a different test in a quantity discount case."
Supra note 2, at 1010 n. 98. But variation in quantity discounts is much more likely to
be injurious than variation in nct prices paid resulting from freight absorption-which
by itself proves nothing at all with respect to injury.
120. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). See discussion, p. 444
supra.
121. FTC, supra note 108, at 7.
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similar concessions to most buyers or within a short period of time open
prices fall. Depending on timing, a concession may be in actuality the
first indication of a price change, not discrimination. Third, a secret price
concession is by definition one that is hard to find and prove. Fourth, a
concession in the form of truck or water shipment is not discrimination if
other buyers are subsequently given the same alternative. Fifth, the buyer
who knows he is being discriminated against will -complain to the seller
before he runs to the F.T.C.-and he is likely to be appeased.
In summary, to bring the potential ill-effects of the Robinson-Patman
amendment to full bloom would probably require extensive and speedy
action by the F.T.C. against small, transient price variations. At present,
fortunately, the Commission seems preoccupied with the rigid and system-
atic nature of delivered price systems, not with the petty internal discrimina-
tions that weaken their very structure.
The F.T.C. Act. The Commission recognizes that natural market factors
may make such systems as uniform delivered price and zone-price perfectly
legitimate. It stresses the factual nature of the problem. It points to
"complex rigidity" as the warning sign of collusion. These views are ac-
curate enough. But in two instances the Commission's "grounds for sus-
picion" are, if not inaccurate, at least not very clear.
The phrases "typically identical prices" and "matching delivered price
quotations" are too broad to be signals for restraint on competition. With
any standardized commodity, identity tends to be the rule, for no seller can
set a price higher than his competitors' and hope to make sales. Perhaps a
better statement of the criterion would be "reasonable flexibility." As a
practical matter, an identity which is ubroken by hidden or open price-
cutting over a variety of market conditions is the identity which deserves
suspicion.
An even less fortunate choice of words occurs in presuming collusion
where pricing is "inconsistent with immediate competitive interests." The
phrase implies that every change in demand or cost should call forth an
immediate response in price. But actual industrial patterns vary considera-
bly. This requires a flexible standard for price response. Immediate com-
petitive interests do not necessarily mean that a seller should take any lower
price that remains above marginal costs. Inflexibility of quoted price in the
face of minor changes in demand or cost, particularly where those changes
are believed to be temporary, does not necessarily mean collusion. But some
concealed price-cutting probably would result after a period of declining
demand or after a substantial reduction in the sales of a particularly un-
fortunate seller, and that this would lead to a falling of the openly quoted
prices. This type of price-cutting would normally result where a seller is
not sure what his competitors are really doing. And uncertainty there will
be unless producers have evolved an explicit or implicit plan for erasing it.
In short, there is little chance of confusing a competitive with a monopolis-
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tic price structure. 112 The FTC, despite occasional vagueness, is not likely to
make a mistake on delivered price systems. It hasn't yet.
Reeiew of the legal status of delivered price policies
The Commission's position does not evidently extend the scope of the anti-
trust laws. If anything, the Commission is more conservative than the
courts. There is no reason to change the conclusions dmvn on the legal
status of delivered price policies in the light of the cases. F.o.b. pricing is
not required. Individual uniform delivered and zone-price systems are legal
where delivery costs are small, where the systems are used with nationally
advertised and marketed consumer goods, or where they are subject to other
logical explanations consistent with effective competition.
Individual sellers in other types of industries may "absorb freight" freely
when necessary to extend their markets and their competitors may do like-
wise. However, delivered price policies are put to illegal use if rigid industry-
wide price structures emerge, or if rigidity appears in a substantial part of
the market. Standardization of all terms of the price bargain is suspicious.
And direct evidence of agreement or disciplinary measures against price-
cutters makes the hiring of defense lawyers a waste of time and--since anti-
trust lawyers come high-a great deal of money.
SUURY A.Zn CONCLUSIONS
The cases culminating in the New Cement decision have caught up with
delivered price systems and recognized them for what they are. The courts
122. As a practical matter, it is easy enough to separate competitive from non-com-
petitive patterns of identical prices. Dr. Corwin Edwards, Chief Economist of the FTC,
has given an excellent summary of the contrasting features:
"Under competition two forces are at work-the incentives which induce competitors
to meet each other's prices, thus establishing identities, and the incentives which induce
them to vary their prices thus destroying identities .... [U]nder competition prices are
not likely to be continuously identical if the business opportunities of the sellers are dif-
ferent. One seller may have more good will than another. One may need new business
badly, whereas another does not.... One may differ from another in his predictions
about the trend of future sales. ... Differences such as these lead to experiments by one
seller which other sellers do not necessarily match or which they concur in only after
hesitation and delay. . . . Even where there is formal conspiracy, the forces of competition
are likely to break through from time to time and produce differences in price which
the conspirators discourage by disciplinary measures. In general, brief and recurrent
periods of price identity are not likely to offer any proof of conspiracy but long sus-
tained identities when analyzed are likely to have been maintained at considerable sacrifice
and by various artificial devices the purpose of which is to prevent prices from diverging!'
Dr. Edwards also points out that collusive pricing, unlike competitive pricing, in-
volves (1) such perfect knowledge of -. hat "competitors" will do that identical sealed
bids occur time after time, and (2) rigorous price leadership, with all price changes in an
area made by the local mill. Statement prepared for delivery before Senate Subcom-
mittee on Trade Policies, Dec. 8, 1948 (FTC Mimeo. Release, pp. 5-6). See also Ed-
wards, Remarks before the Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Dec. 10, 1943
(FTC Mlimeo. Release, pp. 3-5).
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have thus informed business once more that the antitrust laws are con-
cerned with illegal results, and not with the techniques employed to achieve
them. The cases may make business men uncomfortable, but the peace of
mind of monopoly is not yet a recognized reward for economic endeavor. It
would become that if delivered price systems received the full sanction
of law.
Nevertheless the decisions do not point the way to unvarying success in
breaking the back of monopoly power. In basically non-competitive indus-
tries, it takes more than prohibitions of "basing points" to achieve this
goal. The seeker of this result must choose either to reorganize drastically
the market structure or to accept it as inevitably monopolistic and regulate
it as such.
